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The impact of algorithms on legitimacy in sentencing 
Elizabeth Tiarks 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores the extent to which the use of algorithms in sentencing affects 
penal legitimacy, by assessing the consequences of their use on the fairness of 
the decision-making process. The importance of penal legitimacy is emphasised 
and this paper aims to contribute to wider discussions on sentencing and the use 
of algorithms in criminal justice processes, through advancing understanding of 
the impact of the use of algorithms in sentencing on the particular issue of penal 
legitimacy. 
Legitimacy underpins the authority with which institutions act. It is important in 
fostering positive relations between institutions and the public and improving levels 
of cooperation and compliance. 1  Where authorities lack legitimacy, “social 
regulation is more difficult and costly”. 2  The need to establish and maintain 
legitimacy is of particular importance in relation to criminal justice, an area in which 
the state can intrude significantly into the lives of individuals. This is especially so 
for sentencing, making penal legitimacy an important issue. This paper considers 
different approaches to increasing penal legitimacy and argues that the most 
promising is to focus on procedural justice and the fairness of the sentencing 
process. 
Algorithms have been introduced into a variety of decision-making processes in 
the public sector, 3  their uptake driven most obviously by time and financial 
pressures4 and the promise of reducing arbitrariness and bias in decision-making. 
In respect of sentencing, it has been argued that increasing the use of algorithms 
could “mak[e] sentencing law and practice more efficient, cheaper, transparent and 
consistent”.5 Such claims will be considered in the context of both existing and 
proposed uses of algorithms in sentencing, with a view to determining their likely 
impact on the fairness of the process and therefore on penal legitimacy. 
The main focus is the current sentencing system in England and Wales and the 
extent to which penal legitimacy could be affected in this jurisdiction. This paper 
 
1 Daniel McCarthy and Ian Brunton-Smith, ‘The effect of penal legitimacy on prisoners’ 
postrelease desistance’ (2018) 64(7) Crime & Delinquency 917; Tom R. Tyler, Why people obey 
the law (Princeton University Press 2006). 
2 Tom R. Tyler, ‘A psychological perspective on the legitimacy of institutions and authorities’ in J. 
T. Jost and B. Major (eds.), The psychology of legitimacy: emerging perspectives on ideology, 
justice, and intergroup relations (Cambridge University Press 2001) at p.416. 
3 Michael Veale, Max Van Kleek and Reuben Binns, ‘Fairness and Accountability Design Needs 
for Algorithmic Support in High-Stakes Public Sector Decision-Making’ (CHI Conference, 
Montréal, April 2018). 
4 Alexander Babuta and Marion Oswald, ‘Data Analytics and Algorithms in Policing in England 
and Wales: Towards A New Policy Framework’ (Royal United Services Institute Occasional 
Paper, February 2020). 
5 Nigel Stobbs, Daniel Hunter and Mirko Bagaric, ‘Can sentencing be enhanced by the use of 
artificial intelligence?’ (2017) 41(5) Criminal Law Journal 261. 
Journal of Law, Technology & Trust  




provides an overview of sentencing in England and Wales, with a particular focus 
on the absence of a process for deciding between different purposes of 
sentencing, an area of particular concern for procedural fairness. As explained 
below, there are five different statutory purposes of sentencing and the selection 
of one over another can mean different sentencing outcomes, e.g. imprisonment 
rather than a community order. The lack of clarity about how this choice is made 
by sentencers means that, despite measures such as sentencing guidelines which 
have been put in place to structure the sentencing process and encourage 
consistency of approach,6 there remains a lack of transparency about the way 
decisions are made. The impact of sentencing algorithms on this lack of 
transparency will be considered. 
The following section discusses penal legitimacy and explores different ideas 
about how it could be improved, arguing that maximising procedural fairness is the 
most persuasive approach. In section 3, current sentencing practice in England 
and Wales is outlined, highlighting existing issues for penal legitimacy and how the 
fairness of the decision-making process in sentencing is currently undermined. The 
remaining sections then consider the use of algorithms in sentencing and the 
impact on penal legitimacy. Ultimately, it is concluded that an adverse impact on 
penal legitimacy is most likely, due to two key problems which reduce the fairness 
of the process: an increase in bias and a reduction in transparency, in an already 
relatively opaque decision-making process. 
2. Penal Legitimacy 
This section outlines the significance of penal legitimacy and explains why an 
approach to legitimacy based on procedural fairness is adopted in this paper. The 
importance of penal legitimacy can be seen in the impact that sentencing can have 
on the lives of citizens. In jurisdictions which retain capital punishment, 7 
sentencing decisions can determine whether an individual lives or dies. In England 
and Wales, the most severe penalty is imprisonment, with sentencers holding the 
power to deprive individuals of their liberty, sometimes for the rest of their lives.8 
Importantly, prison sentences can have serious implications not just for the 
offender, but also for family members, particularly dependent children. 9  The 
effects of parental imprisonment on children have been described as “profound 
and long-lasting”, sometimes having “so severe an impact on children that it 
 
6 Sentencing Council, ‘About sentencing guidelines’ 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/sentencing-and-the-council/about-sentencing-guidelines/> 
accessed 6 May 2021. 
7 See Amnesty International, ‘Death Sentences and Executions 2019’ (Amnesty International 
Global Report 2020). 
8 As in whole life orders: Sentencing Council, ‘Life sentences’ 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/sentencing-and-the-council/types-of-sentence/life-
sentences/> accessed 4 May 2021. 
9 Lucy Baldwin and Ben Raikes (eds), Seen and Heard: 100 poems by parents and children 
affected by imprisonment (Waterside Press 2019); and Cara Jardine, ‘Eroding Legitimacy? The 
Impact of Imprisonment on the Relationships between Families, Communities, and the Criminal 
Justice System’ in Rachel Condry and Peter Scharff Smith (eds), Prisons, Punishment, and the 
Family: towards a new sociology of punishment? (Oxford University Press 2018). 
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damages their physical or mental health”.10 Non-custodial sentences such as fines 
also have a significant impact on offenders and their families. Sentencers can 
order deductions from minimum subsistence benefits and this can cause already 
difficult living situations to be made even harder, not just for the offender, but for 
any dependents as well. 
Such intrusions into the lives of individuals, both offenders and those collaterally 
affected, requires strong justification and legitimation. However, concerns exist 
about legitimacy in sentencing in England and Wales,11 and a recent report for the 
Sentencing Council in England and Wales found mixed, but overall discouraging, 
results about public confidence in the criminal justice system and sentencing.12 
One approach to improving penal legitimacy is to seek better alignment of penal 
ideologies with public moral consensus; if sentences and outcomes accord more 
closely with the moral outlook of the public, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
the public would therefore consider them just and fair. However, the moral outlook 
of the public can be hard to discern. Hough and Roberts point out that opinion polls 
based on abstract questions can lead to distorted results. They recommend 
providing more detailed information, arguing that the more detail individuals are 
given about a particular crime, the more nuanced responses become (as well as 
becoming less punitive).13 
There are two problems with the idea of aligning sentencing policy with the views 
of the public. Firstly, society is not morally homogenous and the views of 
individuals will vary. As Hampshire states: 
All modern societies are, to a greater or lesser degree, morally 
mixed, with rival conceptions of justice, conservative and 
radical, flaring into open conflict and needing arbitration. … 
No state will realise a perfect fairness in the representation of 
the conflicting moral outlooks within it.14 
This means that, even if it were possible to accurately collate the opinions of 
citizens, it remains highly questionable as to whether these views could be 
translated into a single meaningful moral viewpoint. Secondly, moral opinions can 
 
10 Oliver Robertson, ‘The Impact of Parental Imprisonment on Children’ (Quaker United Nations 
Office April 2007), p.9. 
11 Mick Cavadino, James Dignan and George Mair, The Penal System: An Introduction (Sage 
2013); Ralph Henham, ‘Penal Ideology, Sentencing and the Legitimacy of Trial Justice’, (2012) 
57(1) Crime, Law and Social Change 77. 
12 Nicola Marsh, Emma McKay, Clara Pelly and Simon Cereda, ‘Public knowledge of and 
confidence in the criminal justice system and sentencing: a report for the sentencing council’ 
(2019 Sentencing Council) < https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/publications/item/public-
confidence-in-sentencing-and-the-criminal-justice-system/> accessed 31st May 2021. Of those 
surveyed for the report, 42% said that they were not confident that the criminal justice system 
was fair and 70% thought that sentences were too lenient. 
13 Mike Hough and Julian V. Roberts ‘Sentencing trends in Britain: Public knowledge and public 
opinion’ (1999) vol.1(1) Punishment and Society 11 at p.19. 
14 Stuart Hampshire, Justice Is Conflict (Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd. 1999), p.38. 
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alter according to the context to which they are applied.15 Individual views on 
punishment may therefore vary from case to case, depending on the particular 
offence and offender characteristics and indeed the life experiences of the 
individual engaging in this moral judgment, which have been accrued by that 
particular point in time.16 
It is not clear how the public’s opinion could be determined with a level of 
granularity sufficient to account for the effectively infinite distinctions between 
individual cases. Attempting to identify “public opinion” on sentencing is therefore 
problematic, as “the public” holds a plurality of views about justice and punishment; 
and even individual views on the morality of punishment may vary from case to 
case. 
A more promising method of maximising penal legitimacy is through emphasising 
procedural fairness. This draws on the substantial body of work by Tyler and 
others,17 which highlights the importance of procedural fairness over and above 
the perceived justice of particular outcomes. They concluded that procedural 
fairness was the main factor that people considered when deciding how legitimate 
a decision was and whether it should be accepted or not: “Research clearly shows 
that procedural justice matters more than whether or not people agree with a 
decision or regard it as substantively fair”.18 
Promoting procedural fairness with a view to increasing penal legitimacy is not 
reliant on the peculiarities of particular offences or particular outcomes. The focus 
is on the quality of decision-making processes and the need for a fair procedure 
for reaching sentencing decisions. Where the procedure is viewed as fair, the 
resulting outcomes are more likely to be supported as legitimate.19 
Factors identified as affecting evaluations of the fairness of decision-making 
processes include whether the process is unbiased and the transparency of the 
process.20  Bias has been widely discussed as a key indicator of unfairness, 
including in the context of algorithmic decision-making.21 Transparency has been 
recognised as an important mechanism for the promotion of procedural fairness 
 
15 As highlighted by the famous “trolley problem” thought experiment – see Phillipa Foot, ‘The 
Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect’ (1967) Oxford Review 5-15. 
16 See Erik Luna, ‘Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative 
Justice’ (2003) Utah Law Review 205 at p. 286. 
17 Tom Tyler, ‘What is procedural justice? Criteria used by citizens to assess the fairness of legal 
procedures’ (1988) 22(1) Law & Society Review 103; Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (n 1); Tom 
Tyler and Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: encouraging public cooperation with the police and 
courts (Russell Sage Foundation 2002). 
18 Tracey L Meares and Tom R Tyler, 'Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural 
Justice' (2014) 123 Yale LJ F 525, pp.526–7. 
19 Tyler; Tyler and Huo (n 17). 
20 Mears and Tyler (n 18). 
21 Laurel Eckhouse, Kristian Lum, Cynthia Conti-Cook and Julie Ciccolini, ‘A unified approach for 
understanding problems with risk assessment’ (2019) 46(2) Criminal Justice and Behavior 185; 
Ben Green and Yiling Chen, ‘Disparate interactions: an algorithm-in-the-loop analysis of fairness 
in risk assessments’ (Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, Atlanta, USA, 
January 2019). 
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as it enables verification of how a decision was made and whether this was fair or 
not.22  Regardless of whether a process is actually biased, trust in it can be 
undermined due to a lack of transparency and consequent inability to confirm its 
fairness. In assessing the extent to which algorithms in sentencing affect 
procedural fairness and therefore penal legitimacy, issues relating to bias and 
transparency will be the main focus. 
The next section examines the current sentencing framework in England and 
Wales and highlights issues pertinent to legitimacy. Subsequent sections discuss 
the use of algorithms in sentencing, including both current and proposed future 
uses, and the impact of algorithms on penal legitimacy. 
3. Current sentencing practice in England and Wales 
Sentencing takes place following either a guilty plea or a finding of guilt after a trial. In 
England and Wales most cases end in a guilty plea.23 The prosecutor outlines the facts 
of the case, after which the defence barrister or solicitor (or the defendant, if without 
representation) presents a plea in mitigation on behalf of the defendant. The magistrates 
or judge then decide sentence with reference to sentencing guidelines which are set by 
the Sentencing Council and must be followed, unless contrary to the interests of justice.24 
The sentencer may also be assisted by reports, such as a pre-sentence report prepared 
by probation, advising the court about matters such as the suitability of the defendant for 
certain types of sentence. The sentencing hearing is often quite short, even for serious 
offences. 
In the case of every sentencing decision relating to adult offenders, the sentencing court 
must have regard to the five statutory purposes of sentencing set out in s.57(2) 
Sentencing Act 2020: 
The court must have regard to the following purposes of 
sentencing— 
(a) the punishment of offenders, 
(b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction by 
deterrence), 
 
22 Min Kyung Lee, Anuraag Jain, Hae Jin Cha, Shashank Ojha and Daniel Kusbit, ‘Procedural 
Justice in Algorithmic Fairness: Leveraging Transparency and Outcome Control for Fair 
Algorithmic Mediation’ (2019) Proceedings of the ACM: Human-Computer Interaction 3, CSCW, 
Article 182. 
23 Ministry of Justice, ‘Criminal court statistics quarterly: October to December 2020’ (Ministry of 
Justice March 2021) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-
october-to-december-2020/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2020> 
accessed 12 May 2021; Elizabeth Tiarks, ‘Restorative justice, consistency and proportionality: 
examining the trade-off’ (2019) 38(2) Criminal Justice Ethics 103. 
24 Section 59 Sentencing Act 2020; Sentencing Council, ‘About the sentencing council’ 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/sentencing-and-the-council/about-the-sentencing-
council/> accessed 2 January 2021. 
Journal of Law, Technology & Trust  




(c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders, 
(d) the protection of the public, and 
(e) the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected 
by their offences. 
The operation of these purposes is important to consider, as there is no process in place 
for sentencers to choose between them, which creates a significant problem for 
transparency and fairness in the sentencing process. These statutory purposes of 
sentencing draw on both retributive and consequentialist justifications for punishment and 
are not always compatible with each other. Consequentialist theories are forward-looking 
and focus on the consequences of a particular sentence; and retributive theories are 
backward-looking and focus on punishing offenders in accordance with just deserts, 
regardless of future consequences.25 These purposes of sentencing pull in different 
directions and can produce different sentences, which means that they cannot all be 
pursued at once. For example, a sentence based on rehabilitation (consequentialist) 
might favour community sentences, with requirements involving education or treatment 
for addiction; whereas a sentence based on punishment (retributive) might favour 
imprisonment. Thus, an offender who was – according to the sentencing guidelines – a 
borderline case for either going to prison or not, might find themselves imprisoned by a 
judge who was more inclined to punish; or alternatively given a community order by a 
judge who was more inclined to rehabilitate. Whilst guidelines and sentencing legislation 
might constrain the extent to which certain types of sentence are viable options, the 
purpose selected by a sentencer will still influence the resulting sentence. 
Given the potential impact on sentence, it is surprising that there is no procedure or 
guidance in place for sentencers to follow when choosing between these purposes of 
sentencing. The General guideline: overarching principles sentencing guidelines 26 
expressly state that there is no hierarchy between the five purposes, and it is up to the 
sentencer to determine which purpose of sentencing appears most appropriate in any 
given case: 
The court should consider which of the five purposes of 
sentencing … it is seeking to achieve through the sentence 
that is imposed. More than one purpose might be relevant and 
the importance of each must be weighed against the particular 
offence and offender characteristics when determining 
sentence. 
This means there is a significant ‘black box’ in sentencing decisions – a significant 
aspect of the decision-making process is obscured. Sentencers must have regard 
 
25 See Nicola Lacey, State Punishment (Routledge 1988) for an overview of theories of 
punishment. 
26 Sentencing Council, ‘General guideline: overarching principles’ 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/overarching-guides/magistrates-court/item/general-
guideline-overarching-principles/> accessed 2 January 2021. 
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to the five purposes, based on opposing theories of punishment which pull in 
different directions and aim at different goals, but there is no process for 
sentencers to follow when deciding between them. It is up to the sentencer to 
determine what should be taken into account about the particular offence and 
offender when deciding on the relevant purpose. The selection between purposes 
could stem from a variety of sources: the sentencer’s own morality (secular or 
religious); the sentencer’s political leanings; 27  certain prejudices about the 
defendant, which may for example affect whether they are considered the sort of 
person who should be given a chance at rehabilitation or not; the sentencer’s 
interpretation of the government’s current preference, which could vary depending 
on the particular political climate and may in any event be wrongly assumed by the 
sentencer; or some combination of the above factors.28 
To take an example from caselaw, in Attorney-General's Ref (No 22 of 2011),29 
the defendant (who was of previous good character) had pleaded guilty and been 
sentenced for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent. This was a 
serious attack on the victim with a hammer, causing extensive injuries. The original 
sentence imposed in the Crown Court was challenged in the Court of Appeal. The 
original sentence was a 3-year community order with requirements for mental 
health treatment and supervision.30 The judge in the Crown Court had adopted a 
more consequentialist approach, focusing on the treatment of the offender, which 
best fits with s. 57(2)(c) Sentencing Act 2020 “the reform and rehabilitation of 
offenders”. The Court of Appeal however expressly took a more retributive 
approach, in line with s.57(2)(a) Sentencing Act 2020 “the punishment of 
offenders”, stating that: “the [Crown Court] judge's conclusion … did not make 
proper allowance for the extent to which this defendant, mental ill-health duly 
considered, deserved retributive punishment”.31 
The Court of Appeal therefore substituted a sentence of five years imprisonment 
– a significant increase from the original community order. This was despite the 
offender’s mental ill-health and the court’s awareness that he had attempted 
suicide in the year following the offence, remained a suicide risk and that this risk 
would be heightened by imprisoning him. That the Court of Appeal proceeded to 
sentence him to prison regardless is perhaps illustrative of the extent to which the 
court felt compelled to choose a retributive purpose of sentencing. The 
considerable discrepancy which is possible in sentences, depending on the 
purpose pursued, can clearly be seen in this case. It is problematic that something 
so fundamental to sentencing as what its purpose is, remains effectively 
 
27 Michael Tonry, Punishment and Politics (Routledge 2004). 
28 For more detailed discussion of the possible motivations of sentencers when choosing 
between different purposes of sentencing see Elizabeth Tiarks, ‘Restorative justice and the 
problem of incoherence in sentencing’ (2019) 48(2) Verifiche 43. 
29 [2011] EWCA Crim 1473 
30 Ibid, para 1. 
31 Ibid, para 21 
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unregulated. This is therefore a key challenge for procedural fairness in 
sentencing, as it undermines the transparency of the process.32 
This section provided an outline of current sentencing practice in England and 
Wales and drew attention to concerns about penal legitimacy, focusing on the 
problems for transparency of decision-making caused by the lack of any process 
for deciding between competing purposes of sentencing. The use of algorithms in 
sentencing will be considered in the next section, which looks at both current and 
future possible uses.  
4. Algorithms and sentencing 
The use of algorithms has increased considerably in recent years, including in the 
field of criminal justice.33 Potential benefits include a reduction in judicial bias and 
arbitrariness in decision-making and it has also been argued that algorithms could 
contribute to an increase in transparency in sentencing, as well as reducing 
costs.34 On the face of it, there is therefore the potential for algorithms to contribute 
to improving the fairness of the sentencing process leading to an increase in penal 
legitimacy. 
Existing uses of algorithms in sentencing will be examined, focusing primarily on 
the Offender Assessment System (OASys), a predictive tool with algorithmic 
components,35 which provides risk assessments for use in sentencing in England 
and Wales. The use of risk assessments in a criminal justice context, including 
sentencing, is more established in the US than England and Wales.36 The US 
position will therefore also be considered, to provide further insight into some of 
the issues which arise in this context. 
Following consideration of current uses of algorithms in sentencing, a potential 
future use will be explored, looking at a suggestion made by Chiao, to build a 
machine learning algorithm (MLA) to predict proportionality in sentencing.37 The 
discussion of these various aspects of the use of algorithms in sentencing will 
provide the basis for a consideration of the extent to which they affect the fairness 
 
32 Resolving this through basing sentencing on a single purpose of sentencing has been 
suggested by some sentencing scholars: see Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice 
(Cambridge University Press 2010), but the recent streamlining of sentencing laws in England 
and Wales retained the five purposes in the same form as they had previously appeared and it 
would seem that a change to one single purpose is not something currently under consideration 
(Sentencing Act 2020). 
33 The Law Society, Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System (The Law Society 2019). 
34 Nigel Stobbs, Dan Hunter and Mirko Bagaric, ‘Can Sentencing Be Enhanced by the use of 
Artificial Intelligence? (2017) 41(5) Criminal Law Journal 261. 
35 Ibid (n 37). 
36 Marion Oswald, Jamie Grace, Sheena Urwin and Geoffrey C. Barnes, ‘Algorithmic risk 
assessment policing models: lessons from the Durham HART model and “Experimental” 
proportionality’ (2018) 27(2) Information & Communications Technology Law 223. 
37 Vincent Chiao, ‘Predicting Proportionality: The Case for Algorithmic Sentencing’ (2018) 37(3) 
Criminal Justice Ethics 238. 
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of decision-making processes in sentencing and an assessment of the potential 
impact on penal legitimacy. 
4.1. Current use of algorithms in sentencing 
4.1.1 England and Wales 
In England and Wales, a predictive tool containing algorithmic components known 
as the Offender Assessment System (OASys) is used to help make an assessment 
of how likely an offender is to reoffend in the future, the risk of serious harm to 
others and the management of risk. It is also used to identify any offending-related 
needs and risk of harm to the offender.38 
The algorithmic component dealing with risk of reoffending in the OASys 
assessment is known as the Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS). This 
provides a prediction of the likelihood of reoffending within 2 years and is 
calculated using static risk factors, such as criminal history. The OGRS score is 
used in the calculation of other aspects of the OASys assessment: OGP (general 
predictor for non-violent and non-sexual offending); and OVP (violence predictor), 
both of which also use dynamic risk factors in their respective calculations, such 
as employment, accommodation and attitude of the offender.39 Probation officers 
use their professional judgment, as well as integrating the static risk factors from 
OGRS with dynamic risk factors in their overall assessment of risks and needs of 
an offender. The system structures the way that information is collected through a 
series of questions for the offender, as well as guiding the analysis of the 
information gathered.40 
OASys scores can feed into sentencing decisions when a court seeks a pre-
sentence report (PSR). PSRs are used to assist courts in determining the most 
suitable sentence and are prepared by the Probation Service.41 Probation officers 
use OASys to determine risk alongside their own judgment and this informs their 
recommendations in the PSR about an offender’s suitability for certain types of 
sentence. A PSR includes an analysis of the offence and any pattern of offending, 
the offender’s circumstances and any link to the offending behaviour, proposals 
for sentencing options and an analysis of the likelihood of reoffending and risk of 
harm – informed by the OASys assessment. 42  The assessment of risk and 
analysis of ways in which any risks might be mitigated, are central to the PSR43 
and have the capacity to significantly influence sentence. 
 
38 Robin Moore (ed) ‘A compendium of research and analysis on the Offender Assessment 
System (OASys) 2009–2013’ (Ministry of Justice 2015). 
39 Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, ‘Risk assessment’ (Gov.uk May 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/risk-assessment-of-offenders> accessed 21 May 2021; Law 
Society (n 37). 
40 Moore (n 42) 
41 Sentencing Act 2020, s. 31. 
42 National Offender Management Service, ‘Determining Pre-Sentence Reports - Sentencing 
within the new framework’ (PI 04/2016). 
43 Stephen Leake, Archbold Magistrates' Courts Criminal Practice 2021 (Sweet & Maxwell 2020) 
at A-27. 
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PSRs are not used in every sentencing decision, but can be sought when custody 
or a community order is being considered. When used at a sentencing hearing, the 
PSR is usually addressed by the defendant’s representative – either relying on the 
recommendation made as to sentence, or arguing for an alternative 
recommendation. The PSR is not binding on sentencers, who make the final 
determination and may take the PSR into account to a greater or lesser degree as 
they see fit. That said, the risk assessment contained within a PSR can of course 
be persuasive. 
It is difficult for defence representatives to comment authoritatively on the veracity 
of an OASys assessment, without a considerable investment of time and resources 
which are often in short supply in criminal proceedings, particularly with pressures 
stemming from the current backlog of criminal cases.44 The Ministry of Justice 
have published information about OGRS, including work which analyses its 
predictive performance, but they are not under any legal obligation to do so. The 
availability of some information also does not translate directly into 
understandability,45 nor is it necessarily up to date with what is currently in use, as 
the risk assessment instruments are recalibrated periodically. 46  When the 
prediction is favourable this can work in a defendant’s favour, but when it is not, it 
is extremely difficult to effectively challenge a risk assessment score. 
This difficulty in challenging such assessments is particularly concerning when 
some of the limitations of OASys are considered. These limitations could affect the 
fairness of sentencing decisions drawing on these assessments, due to a lack of 
transparency and the potential for bias in the process. This includes issues relating 
to the design of the system, practical limitations due to the environment in which 
OASys is used and difficulties in identifying and accounting for subjective 
influences which inform the process. 
One issue relating to the design of OASys is the inclusion of socioeconomic factors 
in the assessment. The extent to which these factors hold predictive validity is not 
yet clear and there are ongoing debates about this.47 The use of such factors in 
making assessments about risk has been criticised as operating to discriminate 
against poorer individuals on the basis of factors which they may have little control 
over, and leading to the worsening of existing socioeconomic inequalities.48  
In addition to this, concerns have been raised about whether OASys gives 
sufficient consideration to unfair and prejudicial treatment linked to race. 49  A 
 
44 Jane Croft, ‘Ministers under pressure to fix criminal case backlog in England and Wales’ 
(Financial Times August 2020) <https://www.ft.com/content/ce20e556-4b65-4417-b0c8-
2b1e7b9173db> accessed 21 May 2021. 
45 Oswald et al (n 40) 
46 Law Society (n 37); Moore (n 42). 
47 See Gwen van Eijk, ‘Socioeconomic marginality in sentencing: The built-in bias in risk 
assessment tools and the reproduction of social inequality’ (2017) 19(4) Punishment & Society 
463 at 467. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Diana Wendy Fitzgibbon, ‘Fit for purpose? OASys assessments and parole decisions’ (2008) 
55(1) Probation Journal 55. 
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recent report by HM Inspectorate of Probation has highlighted the need for the 
quality of OASys assessments to be improved for ethnic minority individuals, 
ensuring that diversity factors are captured and discrimination is considered 
sufficiently.50 The report also highlighted the need to improve the quality of pre-
sentence reports, ensuring that “the diversity of individuals is assessed and 
represented appropriately” and that any conscious or unconscious bias is 
countered.51 
Practical limitations of OASys assessments can arise from time pressures and 
related difficulties in obtaining sufficient and reliable information to be fed into the 
process. The pressure of substantial workloads and the need to handle cases 
quickly may limit the extent to which probation officers can effectively gather 
information and develop and explore different hypotheses during the process.52 
This could also limit the capacity for probation officers to effectively exercise their 
professional judgment to counter bias in the system.53 
The use of discretion can be important in the process – for example, Ansbro 
describes an example from her research whereby women who worked as sex 
workers had a high OGRS score due to a number of prostitution-related 
convictions which had been classified as sexual offences in OGRS. Probation 
officers were able to exercise their professional judgment to de-escalate the risk 
of harm assessment.54 However, Ansbro also identifies a number of “bad calls” 
made, where discretion was used in a way which seemed less well justified.55 In 
the context of OASys assessments included in PSRs, there is a lack of 
transparency about when discretion has been exercised in the assessment, 
whether it has been justified and the extent to which it has impacted on the overall 
recommendations. A number of factors, such as training and professional 
experience as well as level of trust in the system, can affect how probation officers 
engage with OASys and the balance they strike between reliance on static risk 
calculations from OGRS and exercising their discretion.56 
The lack of clarity about when discretion has been exercised and how this has 
impacted the overall risk score 57 becomes particularly problematic when 
considered in the context of the environment in which practitioners are making their 
assessments. There are factors which could encourage practitioners to err on the 
 
50 HM Inspectorate of Probation, ‘Race equality in probation: the experiences of black, Asian and 
minority ethnic probation service users and staff’ (Crown copyright March 2021) 
<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2021/03/Race-
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side of caution when making risk assessments, such as a political climate where 
unrealistic expectations are placed on practitioners for high accuracy in their 
predictions about risk, despite inherent uncertainties in such complex 
assessments.58 An overly cautious approach, risking an offender receiving a more 
severe sentence may be preferred than a less cautious approach risking harm to 
others due to reoffending, especially in an environment where there is awareness 
that “failings in practice will be hunted for”59 if a serious offence is committed by 
an offender on supervision. 
The limitations of the OASys assessment itself, together with the issues which 
arise from the difficulty in knowing how the balance between actuarial assessment 
and professional judgment has been struck in any given case – and whether this 
has been unduly influenced by a pressured working environment or other factors, 
mean that transparency in the process is lacking and it is difficult to know precisely 
how any particular decision about risk has been made. Despite this, the 
assessments have a veneer of objectivity and sentencers may therefore treat an 
assessment as more objective than it actually is.60 
4.1.2 The United States 
The use of algorithms to inform sentencing in England and Wales is currently fairly 
limited. There are also uses of algorithms within policing and other areas of the 
criminal justice system61 which may indirectly affect sentencing (such as decisions 
about whether to use diversionary measures or prosecute an individual) – although 
consideration of these indirect factors is outside the scope of this paper. It is 
therefore useful to consider the use of algorithmic risk assessments in the United 
States, as the use of such tools is more prevalent and embedded in decision-
making than in England and Wales. It might also indicate the future direction of 
sentencing in England and Wales in the event of further reliance on, and 
development of, algorithmic tools.62 
The US has seen an increasing use of algorithmic risk assessments in sentencing, 
with some states mandating use of these tools. 63  The use of one popular 
algorithmic risk assessment tool COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management 
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Profiling for Alternative Sanctions),64 was challenged – unsuccessfully – in the 
case of Loomis v Wisconsin Supreme Court.65 It was argued that use of the 
algorithmic tool in sentencing undermined due process because of the proprietary 
nature of the formula and the resulting inability of the defendant to examine and 
challenge the risk score. Whilst concerns were expressed by the court in regard to 
this, they found that the judge retained sufficient discretion in making the decision 
to offset those concerns. Oswald et al note that this does not acknowledge the 
“tendency of people to trust computer-generated decisions”. 66  As highlighted 
above in relation to the use of OASys in England and Wales, such tools can appear 
more objective than they really are, encouraging sentencers to rely on the 
prediction and perhaps making it less likely for discretion to be exercised. 
Having sentencers rely on the prediction would rather seem to be the point of 
employing COMPAS in sentencing proceedings. However, there is a lack of clarity 
surrounding how sentencers should use and interpret such algorithmic risk 
assessments in the US (as with England and Wales), which was also highlighted 
in the Loomis decision. The court discussed the potential for COMPAS to provide 
courts with more complete information whilst also stating that risk scores should 
not be used to determine the severity of a sentence or decide whether an offender 
should be imprisoned. Green and Chen point out the lack of clarity here: “If 
COMPAS is not supposed to influence the sentence, there are few purposes that 
the ‘more complete information’ it provides can serve—and few ways to ensure 
that it serves only those purposes”.67 
Concerns have been raised about the insufficient investigation into the workings 
of these risk assessments by the jurisdictions using them, with few taking steps to 
conduct validation studies of the formulas.68 In the case of COMPAS and similar 
proprietary algorithms, the ‘black box’ effect (due to the inner workings of the 
algorithm not being accessible) means that transparency is impossible. However, 
even where there is some information publicly available, there remain problems of 
usability of the data (as identified above in relation to OASys) and in some cases 
the creators themselves may not adequately understand how the algorithm arrived 
at a particular decision, or be able to obtain an accurate ‘snapshot’ of the 
decision.69 
This means that there is a significant level of trust placed in companies providing 
such algorithmic tools. It also means that it can be difficult to identify problems 
such as corner-cutting, incompetence and unethical behaviour and there have 
been well-publicised examples of such issues in relation to criminal justice. For 
example, the company G4S had its contract terminated after running HMP 
Birmingham in England for 7 years, during which time the prison was the site of 
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riots. The prison returned to government control following an unannounced 
inspection in 2017 which found the prison to be “fundamentally unsafe”, in an 
“appalling state” and a place “where many prisoners and staff lived and worked in 
fear, where drug taking was barely concealed, … and where individuals could 
behave badly with near impunity”.70 
A particularly concerning example of deliberate unethical behaviour in the US was 
the “kids for cash” scandal, which came to light in 2008. This is pertinent to the 
discussion here, as it involved a serious misuse of judicial power and highlights 
the importance of transparency and fairness in the decision-making process for 
sentencing. The scheme involved the replacement of the county-run juvenile 
detention centre in Luzerne County with a for-profit detention facility, instigated by 
Judge Michael Conahan. An agreement was made between the owners of this for-
profit facility and both Judge Conahan and Judge Mark Ciavarella Jr, whereby the 
owners would give the judges a proportion of the money they received for each 
child ordered to be detained in their facility. The judges were therefore incentivised 
to sentence more children to juvenile detention than they would otherwise, even 
for minor offending such as stealing a jar of nutmeg and throwing food at a family 
member.71 The for-profit facility owners benefited financially by having increased 
numbers of children placed in their facility and the judges benefited financially 
through the “kick-backs” from the facility owners.72 
In relation to the use of algorithms in sentencing, these concerns about the trust 
which can be placed in private companies are not just hypothetical. For example, 
allegations of racial bias were made in a ProPublica report investigating the use of 
the COMPAS algorithm in sentencing.73 The report found that the formula used 
incorrectly identified black defendants as future criminals at nearly twice the rate 
of white defendants, and white defendants were more likely to be mislabelled as 
low risk.74 Northpointe Inc. the creators and owners of COMPAS responded to 
these criticisms, arguing that on a different analysis, the algorithm was not racially 
biased.75 However, Eckhouse et al have pointed out that: 
Even if we accept Northpointe’s argument that their risk-
assessment models make predictions that are equally likely to 
be right (or wrong) for Black and White defendants, the 
models are built on data points that make people of color look 
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riskier than Whites, so the predictions are necessarily 
biased.76 
So even if the model itself could be considered unbiased on Northpointe’s analysis, 
the nature of the data used in COMPAS and similar models, mean that such 
algorithms may have racial bias ‘baked in’,77 where there are racial disparities in 
the number of police stops, searches and arrests.78 
This section has explored some of the current uses of algorithms in sentencing, 
looking at examples from England and Wales and the US and highlighting 
problems relating to a lack of transparency and bias. Analysis of these issues will 
be developed further in relation to penal legitimacy in section 5. The next section 
considers potential future use of algorithms in sentencing. 
4.2. Future use of algorithms in sentencing 
The current uses of algorithms in sentencing outlined above concern predictive 
risk assessments, but it is useful to consider another way in which algorithms have 
been proposed to enhance sentencing decisions, especially as further reliance on 
algorithms in criminal justice may well be considered as part of attempts to resolve 
problems in the system. Indeed, this has been advocated for by some sentencing 
scholars.79 
One interesting proposal for the use of algorithms in sentencing has been put 
forward by Chiao,80 who suggests that a MLA could be developed to assist judges 
with assessments of proportionality. This is an aspect of sentencing which has 
been seen as both important and difficult to insulate from judicial bias.81 The idea 
is to create an algorithm focused on predictions about judicial behaviour, rather 
than the behaviour of defendants. The algorithm would “predict what the modal 
judge in a given jurisdiction would regard as the proportionate sentence”,82 based 
on a finite list of factors. As with risk assessments, the idea is that the prediction is 
non-binding on judges. 
Chiao argues that the MLA would provide judges with a “particularized snapshot 
of the central tendency of how they and their colleagues have been treating similar 
cases”.83 It would do this on the basis of proportionality assessments made by the 
judges in that jurisdiction. Chiao suggests that no particular theory of 
proportionality would need to be decided on at the outset: “provided the feature set 
in the input data is rich enough, the algorithm does not need to be encoded with a 
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theory of proportionality”.84 The notion of proportionality therefore comes from 
judicial decision-making as it is made. This proposed model is useful to consider 
in relation to whether it achieves the enhancement of sentencing processes it 
claims, i.e. standardising judgments of proportionality and thereby reducing judicial 
bias. 
The proposal that the MLA is trained on data from existing judicial decisions, rather 
than programmed with an agreed-upon desirable model of determining 
proportionality, is an initial stumbling block. This means that the input data 
originates from the pre-existing source of concern about bias – the judges 
themselves, who are potentially flawed and biased decision-makers. 
Proportionality in sentencing is usually conceptualised as an objective concept by 
which the fairness of decisions can be measured. For this MLA, the judges making 
the decisions which feed into it might be consistently wrong about whether a 
sentence is proportional in the sense that this term is usually understood.85 If the 
original inputs are faulty in respect of proportionality judgments, then the system 
would simply reproduce the disproportionate decisions, with any pre-existing 
biases “baked in”.86 The input data would also be affected by Chiao’s suggestion 
that some flexibility be retained by allowing judges to depart from the advisory 
output of the MLA. Judges might depart from the recommendation for a number of 
reasons and these decisions would then be fed back into the MLA, impacting future 
recommendations. 
The identification of particular factors relating to offence and offender for the MLA 
to use in generating its proportionality prediction is a further issue. Value 
judgments about what should and should not be taken into account by the 
algorithm when measuring proportionality would need to be considered at the 
outset, when building the algorithm. This would be challenging, partly because the 
relevance of a factor is not always obvious when considered in isolation from the 
specifics of a particular case and can vary according to the context (such as the 
current social and political climate or the offender’s background). The impact of a 
certain factor on sentence can be affected by interrelationships with other offence 
and offender factors as well. Ultimately, the same factor could be aggravating, 
mitigating, or make no difference to sentence, depending on the specific context 
of a case.87 
If factors are to be ‘bracketed’ and considered in isolation from the complex context 
of a given case, it is unclear whether this would provide meaningful information. 
There may also be a feasibility issue as to how the combined impact of the different 
factors could be disentangled to identify how a particular sentence was arrived at, 
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and calculate the extent to which each factor impacted on the resulting sentencing 
decision. It is difficult to see how the MLA would be able to understand which 
factors were influential on the decision and in what way – whether a factor 
increased or decreased the sentence, changed the type of sentence or influenced 
the decision about which purpose of sentencing to pursue. The type of information 
needed to be fed into the MLA would require a significant level of detail from judges 
as to how they arrived at their decision, which goes beyond current practice, would 
take additional court time, and would also rely on the accurate subjective reporting 
of the judge. In England and Wales, this would require a significant shift away from 
the current emphasis on brevity in sentencing remarks.88 
This proposed MLA is one direction in which the use of algorithms in sentencing 
might be expanded and is useful to consider as part of the general rhetoric around 
the proposed benefits and capabilities of algorithms and their usefulness in 
enhancing sentencing decisions.89 The above discussion has highlighted some 
problems which are likely to impact on the ability of this MLA to reduce bias in the 
sentencing process. The following section builds upon the discussion of current 
and future uses of algorithms in sentencing in order to explore the impact of 
algorithms on penal legitimacy. 
5. Algorithms and penal legitimacy 
It has been argued that pursuing procedural fairness in sentencing is the most 
promising way of increasing penal legitimacy. In considering the impact of the use 
of algorithms in sentencing on penal legitimacy, bias and transparency will be 
considered. As explained earlier, these are widely accepted as important aspects 
of measuring the fairness of decision-making.90 
5.1 Bias 
The above discussion has raised a number of issues which suggest that the use 
of algorithms in sentencing is likely to increase bias in sentencing decisions. 
Concerns have been raised about racial bias in the COMPAS risk assessment 
algorithm used in the US.91 As outlined above, the company responsible for this 
algorithm has suggested that by a different mode of analysis, its model should not 
be seen as biased. However, it has been argued that the nature of the data used 
means that racial bias may in any event be ‘baked in’,92 as it draws on arrest data 
which is biased.93 Likewise, pre-existing bias would be reflected in the proposed 
proportionality algorithm discussed above, as it is intended that the MLA be trained 
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on data from existing judicial decisions, therefore bringing with it any biases 
exhibited by judges making those decisions.94 There have also been concerns 
raised about OASys, with HM Inspectorate of Probation recommending the need 
for improvement in OASys assessments for ethnic minority individuals.95 There is 
not, however, necessarily a simple ‘fix’ to reduce bias in such risk assessment 
tools. Likewise, it is not clear whether – and if so, how – the use of algorithms in 
sentencing can be adapted or improved so as to function as a useful tool to reduce 
bias,96 which is one of the supposed benefits of their use.  
There is some suggestion that human decision-makers are capable of 
compensating for implicit racial bias, if properly motivated and made aware of the 
issues,97 but this is not the case for algorithms where bias could be more difficult 
to identify and rectify.98 Eckhouse et al argue that there is a wide potential for bias 
of some kind to manifest in algorithmic decision-making and that this is a complex 
problem. They identify three “layers of bias” which can affect algorithms: whether 
the model itself is fair (the top layer); whether the data used is biased (the middle 
layer); and whether there might be more fundamental conceptual problems with 
data driven decisions (the base layer). They describe how these three layers 
interact:  
Each layer depends on the ones below it. If making judgments 
about individuals based on groups is unfair or illegitimate, the 
quality of the data and models do not matter. If the data are 
biased, an otherwise fair model merely reproduces that bias.99  
This means that there is substantial scope for bias in decisions made or assisted 
by algorithms. A further issue was raised by Green and Chen in their study of risk 
assessments. They identified bias arising not just from the algorithm, but also from 
the interaction of algorithms and decision-makers.100 They found that participants 
in the experiment were more likely to increase their risk prediction at the 
suggestion of the risk assessment when evaluating black defendants as opposed 
to white defendants.101  They also found that participants were more likely to 
“deviate from the risk assessment toward higher levels of risk” when assessing 
black defendants. 102  This research was carried out on a lay population, but 
indicates a worrying potential for bias to creep in – something which could be hard 
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to correct for, given the difficulty identifying when and how discretion has been 
exercised, as discussed in section 4 in relation to OASys. 
There are a number of ways in which bias can arise when using algorithms to 
assist decision-making and the current and proposed uses of algorithms discussed 
above appear likely to increase bias in sentencing. This is a complex problem and 
one which is more difficult to provide safeguards against than existing judicial bias. 
It is easier to dispute human decisions through appeal procedures and 
discriminatory judges can be challenged on their behaviour.103 This last point also 
relates to the issue of transparency, which will be discussed next. 
5.2 Transparency 
In addition to an adverse impact on fairness through a likely increase in bias in 
decision-making, the discussion of current and future proposed uses of algorithms 
in sentencing suggests that there is more likely to be a decrease in the 
transparency of decision-making, therefore negatively impacting penal legitimacy. 
The decrease in transparency stems from two aspects of using algorithms to assist 
with sentencing: the lack of information about how risk assessments are arrived 
at; and the impact of algorithms on the already opaque process by which 
sentencers choose between different purposes of sentencing. 
The inner workings of algorithms used in sentencing are not easy, and sometimes 
impossible to ascertain. Proprietary algorithms are a particular problem,104 but 
even where there is some information available, as in the case of OASys, this is 
not necessarily up to date and there are practical barriers to making effective use 
of the information in court. This is further complicated by subjective influences in 
both the development and use of risk assessment tools. As discussed above in 
relation to OASys, environmental factors such as time and workload pressures on 
practitioners, as well as factors which encourage practitioners to err on the side of 
caution with risk predictions, can influence the outcome. 
There is often limited information available about how a particular conclusion has 
been reached by an algorithm (or a conclusion reached through the interaction of 
an algorithm and practitioner using the tool, as in the case of OASys). There is 
therefore a lack of transparency. This can make it difficult to challenge an 
unfavourable risk assessment and concerns have been raised about the impact 
on due process.105 In terms of the algorithms themselves, this is particularly a 
problem for MLAs, 106  such as that proposed by Chiao, as “the information 
regarding the algorithm used to compute a person’s score may no longer exist by 
the time a request for it is made many weeks or months after the score was 
computed.”107 
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The particular context of the criminal justice system is important to note, as even 
if knowledge of the process by which the algorithm arrived at a given risk 
assessment can theoretically be acquired, this may be unlikely to happen in 
practice, as noted in the Law Society report on algorithms in the criminal justice 
system: 
Many of the heavily individualised, legal safeguards proposed 
to algorithmic systems in commercial domains, such as 
individual explanation rights, are unlikely to be very helpful in 
criminal justice, where imbalances of power can be extreme 
and are exacerbated by dwindling levels of legal aid.108 
The imbalances of power which occur in a criminal justice context and the need 
for special consideration of the use of algorithms in this field has recently been 
recognised in the European Commission’s draft legislation on AI, 109  which 
classifies risk assessments used in criminal justice as “high risk” AI systems, i.e. 
posing a high risk to fundamental rights or safety. The draft legislation makes 
reference to the potential impact on individuals, such as loss of liberty, and raises 
concerns about AI systems leading to discrimination and the extra precautions to 
guard against this which are required in the criminal justice context. It also 
highlights the importance of protecting procedural fundamental rights, which “could 
be hampered, in particular, where such AI systems are not sufficiently transparent, 
explainable and documented”,110 thus confirming the importance of transparency. 
There is a pre-existing problem with transparency in current sentencing practice in 
England and Wales, outlined earlier. The statutory framework for sentencing 
currently provides for five purposes of sentencing, which must be weighed each 
time an individual is sentenced. It has been argued above that one of the key 
problems for penal legitimacy in England and Wales is the lack of any fair process 
for deciding between competing purposes of sentencing. This aspect of the 
decision-making process already lacks transparency – it is unclear how sentencers 
decide between these purposes on each occasion of sentencing. It is important to 
consider how the introduction of algorithmic sentencing can impact this issue. 
Algorithmic risk assessment tools provide information concerning the predicted 
risk of reoffending and an individual causing harm. The assessment of risk can 
include an assessment of risk of harm to the offender and needs of the offender, 
as in the case of OASys. However, the risk to the public appears to be given higher 
priority and more prominence in reports. Fitzgibbon notes that “[p]ractitioners must 
undertake a risk management plan where risk of harm to others is concerned but 
 
108 Law Society (n 37) 
109 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and 
amending certain Union legislative acts’ COM (2021) 206 final. 
110 Ibid p. 27–28 
Journal of Law, Technology & Trust  




OASys is less rigorous where risk of harm to self is concerned,”111 which indicates 
a greater focus on the risk that offenders pose to the public than care of offenders. 
Overall then, of the five purposes of sentencing set out in section 57(2) Sentencing 
Act 2020, the information from risk assessments is most directed towards s. 
57(2)(d), “the protection of the public”.112 It may be that this could lead some 
sentencers to focus more on the protection of the public than the other four 
purposes, where they have an assessment of risk as part of a PSR. This might 
provide a perceived increased certainty about the viability of achieving that 
particular purpose. This could be seen as problematic, as there is supposed to be 
no hierarchy between the five purposes of sentencing.113 However, it is not the 
only possible impact of the use of risk assessments on decisions about which 
purpose of sentencing to pursue. 
Whilst the information in a risk assessment is most pertinent to the protection of 
the public, it is also possible that sentencers might rely on information from the risk 
assessment to support other purposes. For example, when deciding between a 
custodial and community sentence, a low risk score could encourage a sentencer 
towards purpose (c) “the reform and rehabilitation of offenders”. 114  A further 
possibility is that the sentencer’s own theory of punishment could impact on how 
the risk assessment is interpreted and used in the decision-making process.115 As 
Green and Chen point out, the introduction of algorithmic risk assessments does 
not necessarily create a more objective framework for decisions, as “risk 
assessments merely shift discretion to different places, which include the judge’s 
interpretation of the assessment and decision about how strongly to rely on it.”116 
Ultimately, it is difficult to know how the use of algorithms in sentencing affects 
sentencers’ choices about which purpose of sentencing to prefer, or the extent to 
which this might vary between different cases and different judges. Algorithmic risk 
assessments therefore increase uncertainty about the process by which different 
purposes of sentencing are selected, exacerbating the existing problem and further 
reducing transparency. 
There have been various measures recommended which might improve 
transparency in algorithmic decision-making, for example the proper scrutiny and 
validation of algorithms before their deployment and making the inner workings 
public.117 This might improve the information available about how algorithms arrive 
at an outcome, although the usability of such information in the criminal justice 
context remains uncertain. It would not, however, clarify the interaction between 
algorithms and probation officers interpreting their outcomes to make risk 
assessments, as in the case of OASys (as argued above). In addition, provision of 
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more information about how an algorithm has arrived at an outcome is unlikely to 
resolve the problem of the use of risk assessment algorithms further obscuring the 
already opaque process by which sentencers choose between different purposes 
of sentencing. 
6. Conclusion 
Sentencing needs careful consideration in relation to the use of algorithms to 
inform decision-making, due to its nature and potential impact.118 Sentencing is a 
particularly intrusive exercise of state power119 with far reaching consequences for 
the individuals involved, as well as wider society. Sentencing is also a complex 
process, requiring consideration of a number of different factors about the offence 
and the offender, and (in England and Wales) making a decision about which of 
five different purposes of sentencing to pursue. How these different components 
are evaluated in the decision-making process can significantly affect the resulting 
sentence. 
The complexity and potential impact of sentencing decisions mean that the 
legitimation of sentencing is both challenging and important. This paper has 
adopted an understanding of penal legitimacy grounded in procedural fairness. 
Where processes are deemed fair, they are more likely to be viewed as legitimate. 
The focus here has been on two key aspects of fairness: bias and transparency. 
The likely impact of algorithms on procedural fairness and therefore penal 
legitimacy is important to consider. This is particularly so where trust in the process 
is already low, for example the 2017 Lammy Review identified “a trust deficit with 
the BAME population born in England and Wales”120 in relation to the Criminal 
Justice System and discussed concerns raised by BAME prisoners about 
perceived unfairness in relation to the sentences they had received. This paper 
emphasises issues which can directly impact on such trust deficits. 
The use of algorithms to aid sentencers is a significant development in the way 
that sentencing decisions are made and there are indications of an expansion in 
use in the future, due to various perceived benefits. To account for the likely 
increase in reliance on algorithms in sentencing, this paper has looked not only at 
the existing limited use in England and Wales, but also the more extensive use of 
algorithms in sentencing in the US, as well as one proposed future use of 
algorithms in sentencing. 
The current and proposed future uses of algorithms in sentencing discussed in this 
paper would not increase fairness in the decision-making process and would not 
therefore increase penal legitimacy. The use of algorithms in sentencing is more 
likely to exacerbate bias, decrease transparency and thus decrease penal 
legitimacy overall. As such, an expansion in their use from the currently fairly 
 
118 Kehl et al (n 50). 
119 Tiarks (n 28). 
120 David Lammy, ‘The Lammy review: An independent review into the treatment of, and 
outcomes for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the Criminal Justice System’ (2017) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi
le/643001/lammy-review-final-report.pdf> accessed 2 September 2021. 
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limited use in England and Wales should not be pursued, unless the complex 
issues relating to bias can be addressed and significant steps taken to increase 
transparency. Even then, there is likely to remain the more difficult problem of the 
adverse impact of algorithms on the opaqueness of the process by which different 
purposes of sentencing are selected, and this may be more difficult to resolve. 
